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Like so many sign codes, the Town of Gilbert’s code 
established a hierarchy of restrictions, with the fewest 
restrictions on ideological signs and the most restric-
tions on temporary directional signs. The only restric-
tion on ideological signs was that they “be no greater 
than 20 square feet in area and 6 feet in height.” Politi-
cal signs could be up to 16 square feet (on residential 
property) or 32 square feet (on nonresidential property) 
in size; may be up to six feet in height; may remain in 
place for several days after the election, and were not 
generally limited in number. Temporary directional 
signs could be “no greater than 6 feet in height and 6 
square feet in area”; no more than four such signs “may 
be displayed on a single property at any time”; and 
such signs could be displayed only “12 hours before, 
during, and 1 hour after” the event. They could not be 
displayed in “the public right-of-way” or on “fences, 
boulders, planters, other signs, vehicles, utility facilities, 
or any structure.”4 
The Church placed signs in the surrounding area 
announcing the time and location of services. Treating 
these signs as temporary directional signs, the Town 
issued code enforcement notices to the Church. The 
Church then sued the Town, claiming that the sign code 
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on its face and as applied to the Church. 
The district court denied the Church’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction and the Ninth Circuit affi rmed 
this ruling5; the district court then granted summary 
judgment for the Town,6 which the Ninth Circuit also 
affi rmed.7 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Town of 
Gilbert’s sign ordinance was content neutral because 
the town did not adopt the code because it disagreed 
with the message conveyed and its interests in regulat-
ing the signs were unrelated to their content.8 In its fi rst 
opinion in the Reed matter, the Ninth Circuit affi rmed 
the petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction, 
despite recognizing that an enforcement offi cer would 
have to read the sign to determine what provisions of 
the sign code applied. The court explained that this 
“kind of cursory examination” for the purposes of de-
termining function “was not akin to an offi cer synthe-
sizing the expressive content of the sign.”9 On a later 
appeal of the district court’s summary judgment for the 
petitioners, the court reasoned that the distinctions in 
the Town’s code between temporary directional signs, 
ideological signs and political signs “are based on objec-
tive factors relevant to Gilbert’s creation of the specifi c 
exemption from the permit requirement and do not 
otherwise consider the substance of the sign.”10 
The Winter 2015 Land 
Use Law Update asked 
whether the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert1 would require mu-
nicipalities throughout the 
country to rewrite their sign 
codes.2 The short answer is 
“yes.” 
At a minimum, following 
the Supreme Court’s decision 
that the Town of Gilbert’s 
temporary directional sign regulations violated peti-
tioners Good News Community Church’s and Pastor 
Clyde Reed’s First Amendment rights, municipalities 
will want to act quickly to amend their sign codes if 
they regulate different categories of signs differently. A 
code that places fewer restrictions on political or ideo-
logical signs than on directional signs likely will not 
withstand judicial review. Whether codes that differ-
entiate between commercial and noncommercial signs 
will withstand review is an open question, but applica-
tion of the Court’s content neutrality analysis would 
appear to require strict scrutiny of even commercial-
noncommercial distinctions—and if the governmental 
justifi cations for the distinction are aesthetics and traf-
fi c safety, which they so often are, this distinction also 
likely will not withstand judicial review. 
Introduction 
To briefl y summarize, the facts are as follows. The 
Town of Gilbert had a sign code that restricted the 
size, number, duration, and location of many types of 
signs, including temporary directional signs. The code 
generally required anyone who wished to post a sign to 
obtain a permit, with numerous exceptions for specifi c 
types of signs including “ideological signs,” “politi-
cal signs,” and “temporary directional signs relating 
to a qualifying event.” The code defi ned ideological 
signs as signs “communicating a message or ideas for 
noncommercial purposes” that do not fall into one of 
several more specifi c categories; political signs as signs 
that “support[] candidates for offi ce or urge[] action on 
any other matter” on a national, state, or local ballot; 
and, temporary directional signs as “not permanently 
attached to the ground, a wall or a building, and not 
designed or intended for permanent display,” and 
“intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and other 
passersby” to “any assembly, gathering, activity, or 
meeting sponsored, arranged or promoted by a reli-
gious, charitable, community service, educational, or 
other similar non-profi t organization.”3
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a speaker conveys”20 as “the crucial fi rst step in the 
content-neutrality analysis.”21 Only if the answer at the 
fi rst step is “no” does the analysis move to the second 
step, which asks whether a facially content-neutral law 
is still content based as a result of its content-based 
justifi cation or adoption by the government “because 
of disagreement with the message.”22 Thus, the Court 
resoundingly rejected the notion that “an innocuous 
justifi cation” can transform a facially content-based sign 
code into one that is content neutral.23
Second, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s rea-
soning that the content neutrality analysis “should be 
applied fl exibly with the goal of protecting viewpoints 
and ideas from government censorship or favoritism.”24 
This reasoning, the Court explained, erroneously 
equates with speech regulation generally a particularly 
egregious subset of speech regulation—that is, regula-
tion of speech based on “the specifi c motivating ideol-
ogy or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.”25 In 
doing so, the Court admonished the Ninth Circuit’s 
failure to recognize the well-established application of 
the First Amendment to speech regulation that targets a 
specifi c subject matter—such as political speech gener-
ally—as opposed to a specifi c perspective.26 
Rejecting classifi cation of codes that distinguish 
based on function alone as content neutral, the Court 
explained that “[s]ome facial distinctions based on a 
message are obvious, defi ning regulated speech by par-
ticular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defi n-
ing regulated speech by its function or purpose,” but 
“[b]oth are distinctions drawn based on the message 
a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict 
scrutiny.”27 Citing Ward, the Court explained that there 
are two categories of laws that are content based—those 
that are content based on their face including those 
that regulate speech by its function or purpose, and 
those that cannot be “‘justifi ed without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech’ or that were adopted 
by the government ‘because of disagreement with 
the message [the speech] conveys.’”28 Content-based 
regulations of speech are subject to strict scrutiny, and, 
where the regulation is content-based on its face, the 
government’s justifi cations or purposes for enacting the 
regulation are irrelevant to the determination of wheth-
er it is subject to strict scrutiny. 
Finally, the Court rejected on factual and legal 
grounds the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of the sign 
code’s distinctions as “turning on the content-neutral 
elements of who is speaking through the sign and 
whether and when an event is occurring.”29 As a factual 
matter, the Court observed that the Town of Gilbert’s 
distinctions were not speaker based, but rather catego-
rized by message type—political, ideological or direc-
tional—and the applicable category depended on the 
content of the message, not the identity of the speaker. 
As a legal matter, the Court observed in dicta that “the 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court and 
the Court granted certiorari11—presumably to resolve a 
circuit split regarding whether temporary sign regula-
tions that differentiate between sign types based on the 
function of the sign are content-based and therefore 
subject to strict scrutiny review.12 The National League 
of Cities, United States Conference of Mayors, National 
Association of Counties, International City/County 
Management Association, International Municipal 
Lawyers Association, American Planning Association, 
and Scenic America13 fi led a brief in support of the 
Town, warning “that adoption of the strict scrutiny test 
has the potential to invalidate nearly all sign codes in 
the country, and would thereby imperil the important 
traffi c safety and aesthetic purposes underlying local 
government sign regulation.”14 The United States, 
numerous religious and civil liberties organizations, 
and nine states fi led amicus briefs in support of the 
petitioners.15   
On June 18, 2015, nine justices agreed with the pe-
titioners that the Town’s sign code was content-based 
on its face, that strict scrutiny therefore applied, and 
that the code did not pass constitutional muster.16 But, 
the justices took such varying routes to this conclusion 
that attorneys may fi nd it diffi cult to determine which 
categorical sign regulations are content based, and 
therefore likely unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
The Thomas Majority: “A Very Wooden 
Distinction” 
Six justices joined Justice Thomas’s majority opin-
ion, which took a literal (some say “wooden”17) ap-
proach to the question of content neutrality. Essentially, 
the Thomas majority opinion stands for the principle 
that, if distinctions in a sign code require reading the 
sign to determine if the distinction applies, the code is 
content based, any content neutral justifi cations for the 
distinctions are irrelevant to the determination of con-
tent neutrality and strict scrutiny applies. Moreover, a 
code justifi ed by aesthetics and traffi c safety will not 
survive strict scrutiny if it places more lenient restric-
tions on political or ideological signs than it places on 
temporary directional signs—because no difference ex-
ists between these categories of signs in terms of their 
impact on aesthetics and traffi c safety. 
In so holding, the Court rejected several theories 
the Ninth Circuit—as well as various amici includ-
ing the United States—had relied upon to support the 
conclusion that the code was content neutral. First, the 
Court explained that the Ninth Circuit’s and amici’s 
reliance on Ward18 was misplaced because the question 
of whether a regulation has a neutral justifi cation is 
irrelevant when the regulation is content based on its 
face.19 The Court characterized the question of whether 
a regulation “draws distinctions based on the message 
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it would seem that, to the extent municipalities intend 
to rely on the concurrence’s list of examples of content-
neutral sign categories, they should do so cautiously. 
The Kagan Concurrence: Bad Facts Make Bad 
Law
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan rejected the 
notion that a content-based regulation must necessar-
ily trigger strict scrutiny, and concurred only in the 
judgment. The Kagan concurrence agrees that the Town 
of Gilbert regulation was invalid, but warns that the 
majority approach will lead to either a watering down 
of strict scrutiny review or courts invalidating many 
democratically enacted laws. Echoing the warnings of 
amici the American Planning Association, the Kagan 
concurrence recognizes that as a result of the Court’s 
decision many municipalities will have to repeal many 
sign regulations. 
In contrast to the literal approach adopted by 
the majority and endorsed by the Alito concurrence, 
the Kagan concurrence takes a functional approach, 
observing that the purpose underlying First Amend-
ment protection simply is not implicated by many 
categorical sign codes. Rather, the Kagan concurrence 
argues that regulation of signs by function, even when 
ascertaining a sign’s function requires reading the 
sign, does not threaten the uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas. Under the majority’s simple, literal test, warns 
Kagan, the Court will “fi nd itself a veritable Supreme 
Board of Sign Review.”35 The Kagan concurrence also 
criticizes that majority for ignoring the last fi fty years 
of sign code jurisprudence, and, indeed, the only sign 
code case cited by the majority opinion is City of Ladue 
v. Gilleo.36 
But, bad facts can certainly make bad law, and ac-
cording to the Kagan concurrence the Town of Gilbert 
sign ordinance “does not pass strict scrutiny, or inter-
mediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test.”37 Like many 
municipal codes, the Town’s sign code banned outdoor 
signs without a permit and created exceptions for 
specifi c sign types. However, the range of those excep-
tions was, as conceded by the Town’s counsel at oral 
argument, “silly.”38 Town of Gilbert’s code created 23 
exemptions to the outdoor sign ban for specifi c types of 
signs and placed varying restrictions on the signage de-
pending on which exemption it fell into. For example, 
the law exempted “temporal directional signs relating 
to a qualifying event,” but placed more severe restric-
tions on these signs than “ideological signs” or “politi-
cal signs.” Temporary directional signs were required 
to be “no larger than six square feet. They may be 
placed on private property or on a public right-of-way, 
but no more than four signs may be placed on a single 
property at any time. And, they may be displayed no 
more than 12 hours before the ‘qualifying event’ and no 
more than 1 hour afterward.” 
fact that a distinction is speaker based does not…
automatically render the distinction content neutral.” 
Rather, “[c]haracterizing a distinction as speaker based 
is only the beginning—not the end—of the inquiry.” 
Indeed, “‘speech restrictions based on the identity of 
the speaker are all too often simply a means to control 
content.’”30
The Court emphasized three guiding principles 
that compelled the result. First, a content-based restric-
tion on speech is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of 
the government’s motive and thus “an innocuous jus-
tifi cation cannot transform a facially content-based law 
into one that is content neutral.”31 Second, “the First 
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation ex-
tends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, 
but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire 
topic” and thus the mere fact that a law is viewpoint 
neutral does not insulate it from strict scrutiny.32 Third, 
whether a law is speaker-based or event-based makes 
no difference for purposes of determining whether it is 
content-based.33 
The Alito Concurrence: An Attempt to Stave 
Off the Sign Code Apocalypse 
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Sotomayor and 
Kennedy, joined the majority opinion and wrote sepa-
rately to “add a few words of further explanation.”34 In 
an apparent attempt to assuage fears that the Court’s 
decision is a harbinger of the sign code apocalypse, 
the Alito concurrence explains that certain distinc-
tions between signs are content neutral and provides 
a non-exhaustive list of sign regulations that would 
not trigger strict scrutiny, including: (1) regulations 
that distinguish between free-standing versus attached 
signs, (2) regulations of electronic signs with content 
that changes, and (3) regulations of the placement of 
signs on public versus private property or on- versus 
off-premises signs. 
But, puzzlingly, the list of content-neutral examples 
also includes signs advertising a one-time event. As the 
Kagan concurrence discussed below points out, this ex-
ample is in confl ict with the majority opinion—an opin-
ion that the Alito concurrence joined with respect to the 
result and reasoning. Under the majority’s reasoning, 
regulations that target one-time event signs are content 
based. Indeed, how would one know that a particular 
sign was covered by the regulation without reading the 
sign—and this simple, literal test is the majority test for 
content-based. 
Given that the Alito concurrence is inconsistent 
with the majority reasoning and does not bind the low-
er courts, its examples of content neutral regulations 
may provide cold comfort to municipal offi cials, attor-
neys and planners. At the very least, given the tensions 
between the majority opinion and Alito concurrence, 
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requires reading the sign. Citing the court’s duty to 
interpret zoning ordinances as constitutionally valid if 
fairly possible, the court held that “Reed has no applica-
bility to the issues before the Court” because Reed was 
specifi cally concerned with a sign code’s application of 
different restrictions—including temporal and geo-
graphic restrictions—to permitted signs based on their 
content” and the plaintiffs in Citizens for Free Speech had 
“not identifi ed any distinct temporal or geographic re-
strictions on different categories of permitted signs [the 
code at issue] based on those signs’ content.”41 In a later 
decision, the same court also concluded that “[b]ecause 
Reed does not abrogate prior case law holding that laws 
which distinguish between on-site and off-site com-
mercial speech survive intermediate scrutiny, the Court 
holds that its prior analysis continues to control the fate 
of plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.”42
That said, many municipalities make functional dis-
tinctions between sign types that can only be applied by 
reference to the content of the signs, and, according to 
the two-step test laid out in the majority opinion, such 
sign ordinances are subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, the 
sign ordinances in two other cases the Court vacated 
and remanded following Reed will probably appear 
familiar to many municipal attorneys and planners.43 
These cases involved a zoning ordinance that governs 
the placement and size of signs with various restric-
tions depending on whether a sign is categorized as 
a “temporary sign,” “freestanding sign,” or an “other 
than freestanding sign,”44 and a sign ordinance that, in 
essence, allows more political lawn signs than non-
political lawn signs in residential districts.45 In each of 
these cases, the lower court had concluded that the reg-
ulation, although content-based on its face, was justifi ed 
by subordinating valid governmental interests, and was 
therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny.46 But, under 
the fi rst step of the Reed analysis, a content-neutral 
justifi cation is irrelevant and each of these ordinances is 
subject to strict scrutiny. 
Moreover, regardless of whether New York courts 
ultimately apply Reed narrowly or broadly, uncertainty 
regarding the scope of Reed is likely to result in more 
claims that sign ordinances—as well as other govern-
ment regulations that distinguish based on categories 
that can be discerned only by reading or listening—are 
subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit 
recently extended the holding of Reed to an ordinance 
that prohibited panhandling47 and the Fourth Cir-
cuit recently applied Reed to an anti-robocall statute 
that carved out exemptions for debt collectors among 
others, concluding that the statute failed under Reed’s 
fi rst step “because it makes content distinctions on its 
face,” and, as a result, strict scrutiny applied whether 
or not the government’s justifi cation for the statute was 
content-neutral.48 
The Breyer Concurrence: A Regulatory 
Apocalypse All Round 
In addition to joining the Kagan concurrence, 
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence in which he warned 
not only of the invalidating effect of the Court’s ap-
proach on municipal sign ordinances, but also on a 
host of other regulations that require reading to deter-
mine the applicability or enforcement of the regulation. 
According to Justice Breyer, the Court’s all-or-nothing 
approach to content neutrality casts a net that will en-
compass a wide range of regulations including regula-
tions of airplane warnings, drug warnings, securities 
regulations, energy conservation labeling, and—citing 
a New York example—signs at petting zoos.39 
Conclusion
The key holding in Reed in terms of impact on 
municipal authority to regulate signs is the holding 
that categorical sign ordinances are content-based. It 
follows from Reed that sign ordinances that regulate 
signs based on their function—such as directional 
signs, event signs, and advertisements—like those 
on the books of many New York municipalities, are 
content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 
The case leaves open the question of whether speaker-
based regulations—i.e., ordinances that distinguish 
between who is giving the message (e.g., signs for gas 
stations)—are subject to strict scrutiny. The case also 
leaves open how sign ordinance cases not cited in Reed 
will be applied in the future. Did the Court implicitly 
abrogate them, or, will lower courts attempt to syn-
thesize Reed and the pre-Reed sign ordinance jurispru-
dence? Will much of Reed be treated as dicta such that 
the line of sign cases not cited remains good law with 
Reed being narrowly applied to codes that impose a 
laundry list of different requirements to different types 
of signs, as Town of Gilbert’s code did. 
The sweeping invalidation of legitimate munici-
pal exercises of the police power that would follow 
from broad application of Reed suggests that lower 
courts are more likely to apply Reed narrowly, relegat-
ing to dicta those portions of the opinion that cannot 
be synthesized with prior sign ordinance cases that 
took a more functionalist approach. For example, two 
weeks after Reed was decided the Central District of 
California ruled in California Outdoor Equity Partners v. 
City of Corona that “Reed does not concern commercial 
speech, let alone bans on off-site billboards,” observing 
that “[t]he fact that Reed has no bearing on this case is 
abundantly clear from the fact that Reed does not even 
cite Central Hudson, let alone apply it.”40 Similarly, in 
Citizens for Free Speech v. County of Alameda, the North-
ern District of California distinguished Reed, hold-
ing that a sign ordinance that applied to commercial 
speech only was content-neutral despite the fact that 
the determination of whether a sign is commercial 
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